Appeasement policy british foreign policy during 1930s

It remains a central concept beyond this historical moment, however, in that it is often invoked in foreign policy debates in the United States and elsewhere as a term of opprobrium to describe concessions to adversaries. Appeasement is not necessarily a policy resulting from fear and weakness, however; it has the potential to be effective if political leaders can understand the distribution of power in the international system. But its strongly negative connotations did not solidify in the English-speaking world until after World War II —

Appeasement policy british foreign policy during 1930s

The theory was that dictatorships arose where peoples had grievances, and that by removing the source of these grievances, the dictatorship would become less aggressive. It was a popular belief that the Treaty of Versailles was the underlying cause of Adolf Hitler 's grievances.

Chamberlain, as even his political detractors admitted, was an honourable man, raised in the old school of European politics. His attempts to deal with Nazi Germany through diplomatic channels and to quell any sign of dissent from within, particularly from Churchill, were called by Chamberlain "The general policy of appeasement " 30 June Rearmament[ edit ] A major structural problem that Chamberlain confronted at the beginning of his premiershipand which was a major factor in development of his foreign policy was the problem of worldwide defence commitments coupled with an insufficient economic-financial basis to sustain those commitments.

A report by the British Chiefs of Staff in that had much influence on Chamberlain read: But the outstanding feature of the present situation is the increasing probability that a war started in any one of these three areas [the third being Western Europe] may extend to one or both of the other two We cannot, therefore, exaggerate the importance, from the point of view of Imperial defense, of any political or international action that can be taken to reduce the numbers of our potential enemies or to gain the support of potential allies".

In —38, a greater emphasis was placed upon the former and in —40 upon the latter. A necessary adjunct to this strategy was rearmament, which was intended to ensure that Britain could negotiate from a position of strength, deter a potential enemy from choosing war as an option, and finally for the worst-case scenario of war breaking out, to ensure that Britain was prepared.

In Octoberas Chancellor of the Exchequer Chamberlain had told the Cabinet "Air power was the most formidable deterrent to war that could be devised". The importance of the R. F at the expense of both the Royal Navy, and even more so the Army. Rearmament entailed major problems for the British economy.

The huge increase in military spending in the late s threatened the balance of payments, reserves of American dollars and gold, inflation, and ultimately the government's creditworthiness.

Chamberlain hoped to detach Italy from Germany, or Germany from Italy he was indifferent as to which, but Japan was considered to be hopelessly intransigent so that Britain could win the arms race with the remaining members of the Axis. In a letter written in JuneChamberlain summed up his views when he wrote: Britain's top military experts consistently advised that the Soviet Red Army was of dubious fighting value.

Germany[ edit ] A major goal of Chamberlain's early foreign policy was to seek a "general settlement" which would win German acceptance and guarantee the peace of Europe by settling all the grievances which he considered justified.

In Mayduring the talks with Reichsbank President Dr. Hjalmar Schacht during his visit to London the British drew up a paper listing their demands as a German return to the League of Nationsa non-aggression pact for Western Europe, a treaty limiting armaments, and "Measures by Germany, in treaty form or otherwise, which will satisfy the governments of Central and Eastern Europe with regard Chamberlain hoped to use the Panay incident to bring the United States out of isolationism, and instructed the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to inform the Americans that Britain was prepared to send 8 or 9 capital ships to the naval base at Singapore, if the Americans were to do likewise, to threaten Japan with a blockade should she refuse to make amends for her attacks.

They are incredibly slow and have missed innumerable busses I do wish the Japs would beat up an American or two! Roosevelt was prepared to agree to was the opening of secret Anglo-American naval talks in London in January as a contingency measure should another "incident" occur in the Far East.

Early negotiations[ edit ] Because of the very noisy agitation of the Reichskolonialbund Reich Colonial League for the return of the former German colonies in Africa, Chamberlain had concluded by that the colonial issue was Germany's most important grievance.

Appeasement policy british foreign policy during 1930s

In January Chamberlain informed the Foreign Policy Committee that he intended to place the colonial issue "in the forefront", though he noted that "the examination of the colonial question could only be undertaken as a part and parcel of a general settlement".

The Anschluss and the Sudetenland crisis[ edit ] The first European crisis of Chamberlain's premiership was over the German annexation of Austria.Mar 15,  · Policy of Appeasement is diplomatic policy of making concession to enemy country in order to avoid was a policy followed by Britain and France during –39 and is the important reason for German success in violating the Treaty of Versailles.

Instituted in the hope of avoiding war, appeasement was the name given to Britain’s policy in the s of allowing Hitler to expand German territory unchecked. Most closely associated with British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, it is now widely discredited as a policy of weakness.

Yet at the time, it was a popular and seemingly pragmatic policy. A copy of the original Versailles Peace Treaty of Peace signed on June 28, (Artur Widak/NurPhoto via Getty Images/Foreign Policy Illustration).

- Justifying Appeasement Appeasement was the foreign policy followed by the British and French governments in the s, whereby they did not attack or confront other governments, specifically that of Germany's, when international laws were breached, but rather .

Appeasement policy british foreign policy during 1930s

Mar 30,  · Professor John Charmley discusses whether Churchill has rewritten the history books to portray himself as a foreign policy visionary during the time of Appeasement. 'History will judge us kindly. Appeasement in an international context is a diplomatic policy of making political or material concessions to an aggressive power in order to avoid conflict.

The term is most often applied to the foreign policy of the British Prime Ministers Ramsay MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain towards Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy .

Neville Chamberlain - Wikipedia